



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 OCT 1975

FOUO-52,641/DS-6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Misuse of DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR Marking

1. It appears that some elements of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are using the marking DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR (ORCON) in a routine manner to replace the old NO DISSEM ABROAD and/or BACKGROUND USE ONLY markings. This marking has appeared on National Intelligence Bulletins (NIBs), Weekly Intelligence Bulletins (WIBs), and message reports. It is noted that ORCON is not fully defined on the inner cover of the NIB. The fact that dissemination of documents so marked must be limited to "Headquarters elements" of recipient organizations is omitted entirely. Further, the marking is being used in conjunction with other markings such as NOFORN, NOCONTRACT, and USIBONLY. These markings are entirely superfluous since the ORCON marking already prevents dissemination to anyone other than the recipient. If the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) cannot disseminate a document to CINCPAC, it obviously cannot be released to foreign nationals.


2. The routine use of this marking is causing significant handling and distribution problems within DIA in that the marking requires "strict compliance with third agency rule procedures" plus dissemination restrictions which limit distribution only to "the Headquarters elements of recipient organizations." This has the effect that DIA cannot distribute documents so marked to the Military Services without permission from CIA. Further it implies we must reorganize our library to insure that Military Department personnel and individuals from other USIB departments cannot get access to ORCON documents generated by the CIA. This would not be a problem if the marking was restricted to the few truly sensitive documents to which this marking could legitimately be applied. However, it creates an administrative nightmare when applied to general distribution documents such as NIBs, WIBs, and other routine reports that already are marked with all the other restrictive markings listed in DCID 1/7.

3. The Defense Intelligence Agency will honor the marking ORCON when it is applied to documents by other USIB members. However, we feel that this marking should not be carried over into DIA general distribution documents. If it is necessary to use ORCON material in such documents/publications, DIA will request the originator to authorize release with substitute markings or to provide instructions for sanitization which will allow it to be released with less restrictive markings.

DIA review(s) completed.

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4. It seems probable that routine use of the ORCON marking will degrade its effectiveness and lessen the security of that information which requires such stringent protection. It is therefore recommended that USIB discourage the use of the ORCON marking on general distribution documents in order to prevent unnecessary administrative problems and a degradation of the ORCON marking.



RICHARD L. CARY  
Colonel, USA  
DIA Member, Security Committee

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